We analyze the financial leverage of firms that collude to soften product market competition, by forming a cartel. We find that cartel firms have lower leverage during collusion periods. This is consistent with the idea that cartel firms strategically reduce leverage to make their cartels more stable, because high leverage makes deviations from a cartel agreement more attractive. Given that cartels have a large economic footprint, their study is also relevant for the capital structure literature, which has largely ignored the role of anticompetitive behavior.
Introduction
A large and growing literature studies the interdependence of financial and product-market decisions. Some of this work studies whether leverage turns rival firms into less or more aggressive competitors, 1 while other work studies how a firm's competitive position affects its optimal financial structure. 2 This literature has focused on traditional product-market strategies, such as the choice of prices, output, and product quality. However, it has largely ignored anti-competitive product-market strategies, like collusion with competitors by forming a cartel. In this paper, we provide evidence that firms strategically change their financial leverage when they form a cartel.
Cartels are illegal agreements in which firms collude with competitors to increase profits, by softening competition. They distort market outcomes and cause significant deadweight losses (see Levenstein and Suslow 2006 for an overview). Cartels are more common than is widely known:
Publicly traded U.S. firms convicted of cartel activity between 1990 and 2010 accounted for more than one fifth of the total U.S. market capitalization.
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Cartel agreements are difficult to enforce, since they are illegal. This makes them potentially unstable, because each cartel firm has an incentive to deviate from the agreement and steal profits from the other cartel firms. Maksimovic (1988) analyzes how financial leverage affects this incentive to deviate. In his model, cartel firms use "trigger strategies" (Friedman 1971 ) to enforce a collusion agreement: Any deviation is punished by having all cartel firms revert to unfettered competition, and the threat of losing future collusion profits keeps cartel firms from deviating. Maksimovic (1988) shows that financial leverage worsens the incentive to deviate: Firms focus on their payoffs net of debt payments, and if the debt payments are sufficiently large, the threat of destroying future profits loses weight, compared with the one-time profit from deviating. The main prediction is that a cartel is stable only if all cartel firms have sufficiently low leverage.
1 Exogenously given debt can make firms more aggressive (Brander and Lewis (1986) ), or less aggressive (Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) , Maksimovic and Titman (1991) , Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) ), or the effect may be ambiguous (Showalter (1995) ); with endogenous borrowing, firms with debt are less aggressive (Povel and Raith (2004) ). Empirically, Opler and Titman (1994) , Chevalier (1995a,b) , Phillips (1995, 1997) , Khanna and Tice (2000) , and Grullon, Kanatas and Kumar (2006) find that debt makes firms less aggressive; Zingales (1998) and Busse (2002) find the opposite; Phillips (1995) and Dasgupta and Titman (1998) find mixed results. 2 See Maximovic and Zechner (1991) or MacKay and Phillips (2005) . 3 This is based on firms included in the Private International Cartels (PIC; see Section 3) and Compustat databases. more homogenous, since it is then easier and more attractive to take away profits from other cartel firms by deviating. Fourth, leverage reductions should be less pronounced during recessions, because deviations are less attractive if aggregate profits are low.
To test these predictions about conditions under which leverage reductions should be more pronounced, we use triple-differences setups. The evidence supports the predictions: The leverage reductions by cartel firms are more pronounced if leverage is higher before collusion starts, when firms face stronger competitive pressure, and when the benefits from collusion are more significant; and the leverage reductions are smaller during recessions.
Finally, we discuss the validity of several possible alternative explanations: Changes in leverage may be caused by changes in profitability; they may be caused by cartel firms facing a tighter credit environment; they may be precautionary, if cartel firms are concerned with the risk that their cartel may break up; or they may be attempts by cartel firms to "launder" illicit profits (see Section 5 for details). None of these alternative explanations is supported by our tests. Overall, the intuition from Maksimovic (1988) is the only explanation that is consistent with the evidence.
The main contribution of our paper is to show that when firms decide to collude by forming a cartel, this decision affects their optimal capital structure, leading many cartel firms to reduce their leverage strategically. Consistent with this, leverage rebounds when a cartel breaks up and there is no longer a need to keep leverage low. The mechanism causing these changes has been analyzed on a theoretical level (see Maksimovic 1988 and Stenbacka 1994) , but the empirical validity of the theory has remained unexplored. Our paper fills this void.
As suggested above, our findings have implications for the literature studying the interdependence of financial and product-market decisions. The focus of this work is on traditional product-market strategies: output, pricing, product quality, advertising, etc. New insights can be gained by including explicitly anti-competitive strategies in the analysis of product-market decisions. 4 Given that cartels have a large economic footprint, our findings are also relevant for the 4 Busse (2002) and Phillips and Sertsios (2013) show that high leverage makes firms more aggressive (for example, they are more likely to start price wars). They argue (but do not show) that this could be due to the breakup of tacit collusive agreements. (Tacit collusion can also be supported by trigger strategies.) Lamoreaux (1985) and Grossman and Paulson Gjerde (2009) study specific cartels and argue that they failed in part because of high debt.
capital structure literature: Anti-competitive behavior is an important factor that can explain capital structure decisions.
Our paper is also relevant for antitrust research, because our findings support the idea that cartel firms use reductions in leverage to stabilize cartels. Our paper is related to some recent work linking antitrust and finance issues. Dasgupta and Žaldokas (2018) test whether "strategic debt" (Brander and Lewis 1986) or the need for financial flexibility due to a threat of predation (Bolton and Scharfstein 1990) better explain leverage changes after changes in antitrust policies, but they do not study the role of capital structure in the functioning of a cartel. Dong et al. (2016) study how changes in antitrust policies affect profits and M&A activity, but they do not consider the effects on capital structure. Finally, Artiga et al. (2013) and Campello et al. (2017) investigate cartel convictions from the perspective of corporate governance.
Hypotheses
In "trigger strategy" models of collusion (see, e.g., Friedman 1971), firms repeatedly compete in the product markets, but they try to increase their profits by colluding, i.e., agreeing to produce less and charge higher prices than they otherwise would. This generates higher profits, but each firm has an incentive to deviate from such a cartel agreement: If all other firms follow the agreed policy, a deviating firm can increase its profit even more by stealing market share from the more restrained cartel firms. This threat of deviations destabilizes cartels, but such deviations can be prevented if the cartel firms agree to use "trigger strategies", requiring all firms to follow the agreement in each period and to revert to unfettered competition if there is a deviation. This threat of destroying future collusion profits makes a deviation less attractive.
The incremental profits would be lost for all firms, but if this threat prevents deviations, then in equilibrium it is never executed, and the profit losses do not arise.
Not all cartels need to rely on trigger strategies to sustain collusion. For example, a cartel may be able to monitor every cartel member's product market decisions and to directly punish (and thus prevent) deviations. However, not all cartels are this stable, and for those less stable cartels, trigger strategies may work.
financial leverage makes the threat of deviations worse and thus makes cartels inherently less stable. The intuition is that with sufficiently high debt, shareholders care less about losing future collusion profits or possibly going bankrupt once unfettered competition resumes, while the onetime profit from deviating is, in relative terms (net of debt payments), more significant. The debt payment obligations reduce all of these profits by similar amounts (possible bankruptcy makes the effect more extreme), compared to a debt-free setting, and it thus magnifies the relative importance of the deviation profit compared with the collusion profit or unfettered-competition profit (which may be zero with sufficiently high debt).
The main result in Maksimovic (1988) is that for cartels that have to rely on trigger strategies, cartel stability requires that all cartel firms have sufficiently low leverage. This leads to the cross-sectional prediction that cartel firms have lower leverage than non-cartel firms.
H1: Actively colluding cartel firms have lower leverage than other firms.
Testing this hypothesis is not straightforward. Cartel and non-cartel firms might differ in many observed and unobserved characteristics, making it hard to draw inferences from a crosssectional comparison. So, instead of focusing on pure cross-sectional tests, we use a differencein-differences approach: We examine how leverage changes between collusion and noncollusion periods for cartel firms (within-firm variation), relative to a set of control observations coming from non-collusion periods or non-cartel firms (for details, see Section 3).
There are no explicit results in Maksimovic (1988) about changes in leverage when firms shift from being competitors to being actively colluding cartel firms. However, the analysis in Maksimovic assumes that firms are aware that financial leverage can cause aggressive productmarket behavior and must therefore be sufficiently low if a cartel is to be stable (the incentive constraints in the model compare payoffs net of debt payments). 5 In this context, if firms agree to form a cartel, they should also agree to make it stable. We thus expect that firms strategically change their leverage when they form a cartel to make the cartel stable.
Given that Maksimovic's (1988) Similarly, the Maksimovic (1988) model does not predict how leverage changes when collusion ends (collusion breakdown is an off-equilibrium event in his model). In practice, some cartels operate for extended periods of time, until they are discovered and forced to disband.
Others break up before they are discovered. One possible reason for a cartel's break-up may be a weakening of discipline: If the cartel firms take the stability of their cartel for granted, they may be tempted to increase their leverage to "normal" levels, say, to earn additional tax savings. But this creates an incentive to deviate from the collusion strategy, causing the cartel to fail. In that case, we should observe leverage reversions prior to cartel breakups. More importantly, whether this happens or not, we expect leverage to revert to average, pre-collusion levels after a cartel's activities have ended: Without the benefit of supporting collusion, there is no strategic reason to 6 Detailed case studies of historical cartels (see, e.g., Herold and Paha, 2018) show that they were often formed in response to negative shocks that hit an industry. The decision to collude followed soon after the shock was realized, leaving little time to coordinate and implement reductions in leverage. Such cartels may have become stable once delayed leverage reductions happened, or they may have fallen apart before leverage reductions could add stability.
have abnormally low leverage.
H3: Cartel firms undo leverage changes near the end of a cartel's period of activity.
Our interpretation of the model and results in Maksimovic (1988) Importantly, the strength of competitive pressure also affects the incentives to deviate from a collusion agreement, and thus the stability of a cartel. With undifferentiated products, cartel firms should find it more tempting to deviate from a collusion agreement, because it is easier to take market share away from the other cartel firms. Cartel instability is therefore a stronger concern when potential cartel firms face stronger competitive pressure, and we therefore expect such cartels to more likely require reductions in leverage, or to require larger reductions.
H5:
The leverage reduction is more pronounced for cartel firms that face stronger competitive pressure.
A third factor that influences the collusion and leverage decisions is the size of the incremental profit from collusion. If the incremental profit is not large, then the cost of a large reduction in leverage (lost tax shields, etc.) may outweigh the benefits (higher profits), and collusion may not be feasible (a cartel may not be formed, or it may fall apart quickly).
Collusion remains feasible, however, if the required leverage reduction is small. On the other hand, if collusion generates large incremental profits, then all cartel firms should be willing to make an extra effort to ensure the cartel's stability, including a large reduction in leverage. We thus expect large reductions in leverage only if a cartel generates significant incremental profits.
H6:
The leverage reduction is more pronounced for cartels that let firms earn larger incremental profits.
The state of the economy constitutes a fourth factor that influences the collusion and leverage decisions. If the economy is in a recession, the costs and benefits of a deviation from the cartel agreement are different than if times are good. Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) analyze this in a trigger-strategy collusion model, in which demand is uncertain and changes from period to period, and firms can observe the current state of demand before making their product-market decisions. During a boom, aggregate profits are larger, so the short-term profits from deviating are larger, and therefore it is harder to sustain a cartel during booms. Stenbacka (1994) expands that model to analyze the role of debt. Consistent with Maksimovic (1988) , he finds that higher debt levels make it harder to collude, and for a given debt level, collusion is harder to sustain in booms and easier to sustain in recessions. Hence, to avoid instability, cartel firms have to reduce their debt by more if a cartel is operating during times in which the economy is doing well, and smaller reductions are sufficient if a cartel operates in a recession.
H7:
The leverage reduction is less pronounced during recessions.
Data and Variable Construction
Our analysis uses the Private International Cartels (PIC) database, which contains information on virtually all private international cartels detected by antitrust authorities between 1990 and 2012. This database is described in detail in Connor (2014) . To our knowledge, it is the most inclusive data set on cartels available, and it is used in several recent papers on collusion.
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Recent studies that do not use the PIC data include Levenstein and Suslow (2016) The PIC data set covers only "private" cartels -government-sanctioned "public" cartels (for example, OPEC) are excluded, because they are not at risk of prosecution. Furthermore, the data include only cartels with an "international" flavor, i.e., cartels that include firms from multiple countries, or cases in which an antitrust authority pursued foreign firms. This allows for a more complete coverage of cartel activity, since cartels involving (say) U.S. firms may operate or be prosecuted outside the U.S. Excluding cartels whose participants and activities were limited to one country does not seem to limit the sample in a significant way, since large cartels tend to include foreign firms or operate in multiple countries.
The information in the PIC database is collected from press releases issued by antitrust authorities such as the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in the U.S., the European Commission (Directorate-General for Competition), or Canada's Competition Bureau.
Firms are included in the database if an antitrust authority imposed fines or if class action lawsuits were filed. Since many cartels remain undetected (Connor (2014) estimates that only about 10-30% of all cartels are detected; see also Bryant and Eckard (1991) ), the data does not include all cartels but only those that were detected and for which a conviction was possible.
Given that the PIC database only includes firms that were actively colluding cartel firms, it does not allow us to test whether non-cartel firms were contemplating the formation of a cartel. We also do not know with certainty that firms not included in the database never were in a cartel.
However, the data allows us to test predictions contingent on a firm being a cartel firm, and to attribute changes in their capital structure to their decision to join a cartel. That is how we formulated the hypotheses in Section 2.
From the PIC database, we collect the following information for each cartel firm: Name, country of incorporation, and the start and end dates of the collusive agreements. We restrict the sample to U.S. firms, since several of our tests use additional data sets that focus on U.S. firms. We require that these firms are included in Compustat, which is the case for 213 firms. We use
Compustat data starting with the year 1985, since the first cartel in our data was formed in 1990 and we use data for up to five years before the start of a cartel (and up to five years after a cartel is dissolved).
Many of those cartel firms participated in more than one cartel, so they have multiple collusion periods that may overlap. This complicates the process of grouping firm years into precollusion, collusion, and post-collusion years. Since the timing of collusion is central to our identification, we resolve this issue by dropping firms that participated in more than one cartel during the sample period. The reduction in the sample size is significant but unavoidable. The final sample includes 1,368 firm-years for 90 cartel firms. 8 Out of these, 569 observations correspond to active collusion years, 401 to pre-collusion years, and 398 to post-collusion years.
In the Appendix (Table A1) , we provide some details about characteristics of multiple-cartel firms (excluded from the main sample) relative to single-cartel firms, focusing on the same variables we present below (in Table 1 ) for the sample used in our tests. (All variables are defined in the Appendix; financial variables are constructed using Compustat data and are winsorized at the 1% level.) Interestingly, the average leverage ratio is slightly lower for multiple-cartel firms, compared with single-cartel firms (25.0% vs. 26.6%). This is consistent with the prediction that cartel firms have lower leverage than non-cartel firms (multiple-cartel firms have more collusion firm-years during the sample period, and they likely have a stronger incentive to reduce their leverage), but this is merely a simple, cross-sectional comparison. More importantly, the fact that multiple-cartel firms have lower leverage suggests that by focusing on single-cartel firms we test for the strategic role of debt in a sample where leverage reductions are less likely or less pronounced, making it harder to detect in tests. That is, our sample selection, if anything, would bias against us finding evidence on the strategic role of debt.
In several of our tests we use a matched set of "non-cartel" firms as controls for our sample of single-cartel firms. We restrict the potential set of control firms to U.S. firms included in
Compustat that were not cartel firms, i.e., they were not in the PIC database, and that operate in the same industries (4-digit SIC code) as the sample of single-cartel firms (56 industries). 9 To reduce the probability of control firms being "false negatives" (i.e., undetected firms that are part of international collusive agreements) we further restrict the set of candidate control firms to those without operations outside the U.S.
We use coarsened exact matching (CEM) (Blackwell et al. 2009; Iacus et al. 2011 Iacus et al. , 2012 Balsmeier et al. 2016 ) to obtain a set of control observations comparable to those from the singlecartel sample. In this matching approach, "treated" and "control" samples are divided into cells by multivariate sorting, and then matched within each cell. We sort observations by logarithm of assets (10 bins), logarithm of sales (10 bins) and cash flow volatility (100 cells), within each of the 56 industry classifications of cartel firms. CEM first drops any observations from the sample that do not have at least one counterpart in the opposite group. Thus, CEM enforces common support between the treated and control groups. CEM then produces a weight for each observation that ensures joint covariate balance between the treated and control groups. A key advantage of CEM matching over other matching techniques is that there is no need to fix the control sample size ex ante (e.g., 1:N matching as with propensity score matching). Table 1 reports the covariate differences between the cartel and control observations. Eightynine out of ninety firms found a matched pair with common support. The matching seems to work well in reducing imbalances in observables: The firm-level variables are not statistically different across the two groups, with the exception of payout. (The differences in observables when comparing cartel firms with the un-matched control sample are reported in Appendix Table A.2 .) The absence of discernible differences between the average leverage ratios suggests that the different leverage we might observe for cartel firms can be attributed to within-firm changes. That is, to changes made by cartel firms that transition from pre-collusion periods to collusion periods and then post-collusion periods. 
Empirical Analysis

Leverage During and After Collusion Years
To analyze the relation between collusion and financial policies we use the following baseline empirical model:
The subscript i indexes firms, and t indexes years. Our main dependent variable, yit, is book leverage.
Our specification is essentially a difference-in-differences strategy with two treatments: Collusion and Post Collusion. Collusion takes a value of 1 for cartel firms during collusion years, and 0 otherwise; Post Collusion takes a value of 1 for cartel firms during the 5 years after a cartel is dissolved, and 0 otherwise. This research design compares differences between collusion years of cartel firms with both non-cartel firms and non-collusion years of cartel firms. It also differentiates years after collusion from other non-collusion years to capture the potential effects of a cartel's dissolution on its members' financial policies. 10 Given that the control sample was obtained using CEM, each observation is weighted using the weights obtained in the matching.
Our key parameter of interest is , which under Hypothesis H1 should be negative. We include a set of controls X that comprises variables commonly used in the capital structure literature (e.g., Lemmon et al. 2008 ): Lagged Tangibility, lagged Profitability, lagged Sales, and lagged Cash Flow Volatility. Firm and industry-by-year fixed effects are represented by and , respectively. 11 Controlling for industry-by-year fixed effects allow us to control for industry-level trends that affect both cartel and non-cartel firms simultaneously.
Alternatively, we can estimate the effects of collusion on firms' capital structure using cartel firms only (i.e., the "eventually treated" sample). Given that cartel firms collude at different points in time, the non-colluding years of some cartels act as control observations for the colluding years of other cartels. Estimating the effects using the eventually treated sample helps to explore whether changes in behavior can be attributed to the treated group, rather than to the control group. It also mitigates concerns regarding the comparability across cartel (treated) and non-cartel (control) firms in terms of unobservables, since all firms in the eventually treated sample chose to collude at some point in time (i.e., they share the decision to collude). The downside is a loss of power due to the reduced sample, and that we can only include year fixed effects instead of industry-by-year fixed effects, which precludes us from controlling for industry-level trends that might affect cartel firms at the time of collusion. Since the eventually treated sample does not include matched control firms, each observation is equally weighted. Table 2 presents the baseline results. Columns (1) and (2) show the results using both cartel and non-cartel firms. Columns (3) and (4) show the results using cartel firms only (i.e., the "eventually treated" sample). In Columns (1) and (3) we present the results from regressions without controls, while in Columns (2) and (4) we control for capital structure determinants previously used in the literature. In all four regressions, Collusion has a significant negative effect on leverage, reducing it by around 3 percentage points. These effects are statistically significant at 5% levels, and they are economically significant too: As shown in Table 1 , the average leverage ratio of cartel firms is 27%, so the leverage ratio decreases by over a tenth. The coefficients for Collusion are very similar across the four columns, which suggests that the effect is driven by cartel firms reducing their leverage ratio, and not by leverage changes made by non-cartel firms (recall that Columns (3) and (4) use cartel firm data only). Overall, our findings are consistent with Hypothesis H1.
11 In all our specifications we adjust standard errors for heteroscedasticity and industry clustering. We cluster standard errors at the industry level because firms compete and collude at this level of aggregation. This clustering strategy allows for three types of arbitrary correlations in the error term: (1) Error correlation across different firms in a given industry and year; (2) error correlation across different firms in a given industry over time; and (3) error correlation for a given firm over time (see Petersen (2009) (1) and (2) show that the pre-collusion and post-collusion leverage levels are very similar: The coefficient on Post Collusion is insignificant, positive, and small (close to zero in Column (2)). The coefficient of Post Collusion is negative but statistically insignificant in Columns (3) and (4). Given that the specifications in Columns (3) and (4) include year fixed effects rather than industry-by-year fixed effects, the negative and insignificant coefficient on Post Collusion may be driven by industry trends.
Timing of the Leverage Reduction
We study the timing of the leverage reduction, relative to the time collusion started.
According to Hypothesis H2, the leverage reduction should coincide with the onset of collusion or be slightly delayed. If we found instead that the leverage reduction precedes the onset of collusion, then one could argue that an exogenous (unexplained) negative shock to leverage merely facilitated collusion, and that there is no evidence to support the intuition that firms strategically reduce leverage to stabilize a cartel.
To examine the evolution of firm leverage we examine whether there are changes in the dependent variable before (and after) the treatment period (in our case, the collusion period).
12
Specifically, we estimate the following variation of Equation (1) using the full sample of cartel and matched non-cartel firms:
The subscript h indexes the years that immediately precede collusion years (h { −2, −1}), years that immediately follow collusion years (h {1, 2,}), or years that are collusion years (h {col1, col2, col3, oth. col} for full collusion years ("oth.col" includes the fourth and later years of collusion), h = 0 -for a partial collusion year at the start of a cartel, and h = 0 + for a partial collusion year at the end We plot the regression coefficients β ℎ and their 95% confidence intervals in Figure 1 , using
Leverage as the dependent variable. The results suggest that the decrease in Leverage is concentrated in the collusion years. In the preceding years, the coefficients are not significantly different from zero. Furthermore, leverage returns to average levels when collusion ends. These results support Hypotheses H2 and H3 (and thus also Hypothesis H1), and the intuition that firms strategically change their leverage to stabilize their cartel. The results offer no support for the reverse interpretation, that low leverage levels are the cause of collusion. However, the results do not exclude the possibility that there may be omitted variables that caused reductions in leverage. We will address this possibility below, with a series of triple-differences analyses.
Figure 1 here
The patterns in Figure 1 show the timing of changes to the leverage ratio, but it is interesting to examine whether the changes we observe are due to a drop in debt (the numerator) or an increase in assets (the denominator). Figure 2 displays the coefficients for the specification (Equation (2)) used to create Figure 1 , but using separately the logarithm of debt and the logarithm of assets as the dependent variable. The coefficients strongly suggest that reductions in debt levels are driving the decrease in leverage shown in Figure 1 . There is no apparent change in the assets of cartel firms.
This also mitigates a possible concern, that the reduction in leverage we observe during collusion years may be caused by an increase in retained earnings, which in turn increase assets, and thus may mechanically reduce leverage ratios. 
Triple-Differences Analyses
The results presented so far, that cartel firms reduce their leverage at the onset of collusion, suggest that cartel firms strategically reduce their leverage to make their cartel agreement more stable. However, there may exist unobserved confounding factors that drive both the leverage and collusion choices. We now use a series of triple-differences analyses to study whether the changes in leverage are more pronounced in situations for which Hypotheses H4-H7 predict that it should be more likely or stronger. If the evidence is consistent with those hypotheses, we can be more confident with our interpretation, that leverage is used strategically to stabilize cartels.
We first perform sample splits based on cross-sectional (time-invariant) firm characteristics.
Specifically, we test Hypotheses H4-H6, that the leverage reduction should be more significant if the pre-collusion leverage ratio is high, if firms face stronger competitive pressure, and if the benefit of colluding is larger. There are two possible concerns with this type of analysis. First, it may be that some of these scenarios also affect the likelihood of firms deciding to form a cartel, not just how significant the threat of a deviation from a cartel agreement is. That is not a concern in our setting, since we test how firms change their leverage conditional on having decided to form a cartel (otherwise the firms would not be included in the PIC data). A second concern is the lack of power due to the small sample size. Our sample of cartel firms is not large enough to document statistically significant differences in the coefficients across all sample splits. Our goal is thus merely to show that the direction or magnitude of the effects across sample the splits follow the intuition derived from the Hypotheses.
To test for Hypothesis H7 we cannot rely on a sample split, as the prediction is not crosssectional in nature: We study whether time-varying incentives to sustain collusion (or deviate from it) are related to the extent of the leverage reductions. In particular, Hypothesis H7 predicts that the leverage reduction should be smaller during recessions, and we test it by interacting a dummy for recession years with the Collusion dummy.
Initial Leverage
Hypothesis H4 predicts that the leverage reduction should be more likely and more pronounced if a cartel firm had higher leverage in the pre-collusion years: With higher leverage it is more likely that cartel firms are tempted to deviate from the cartel agreement, and therefore larger leverage reductions are needed to add stability. To test this prediction, we compute each firm's leverage ratio during the first year of data availability in our sample (initial leverage), and then we split the sample of cartel firms in two: Firms with high initial leverage (above the sample median), and firms with low initial leverage (below the sample median). We then match each subsample as described in Section 3 (CEM within industries, based on size and cash flow volatility), including as an additional matching dimension the sample split variable, which in this case is initial leverage.
This ensures that high/low-initial leverage cartel firms are matched with non-cartel firms from the same industry, with similar size and cash flow volatility, and also with similar initial leverage.
We then estimate Equation (1) separately for the two subsamples. The results are presented in Table 3 . The decrease in leverage is significant for high-leverage firms, but it is insignificant for low-leverage firms. The decrease in leverage by high-leverage firms is economically large, close to five percentage points, and it is larger than that reported in Table 2 for the pooled sample. The results thus support Hypothesis H4. 
Competitive Pressure
We now test Hypothesis H5, that the leverage reduction should be more likely or more significant for firms that face stronger competitive pressure. The intuition for this prediction is that competitive pressure arises when firms cannot differentiate their products, and it is therefore easier for a cartel firm to profitably deviate from the cartel agreement and take profits away from the other cartel firms. With stronger competitive pressure, cartel firms should be more concerned about cartel stability and take all available steps to make their cartel stable, including requiring larger leverage reductions.
Measuring the competitive pressure a firm faces is not straightforward. The traditional approach is to use industry concentration (e.g., the Herfindahl index), and to argue that concentrated industries are less competitive. However, industry structure is affected by entry and exit, and concentrated industries may be particularly competitive (Sutton 1991). 13 An alternative is to focus more directly on how firms can avoid direct competitive pressure, in particular by differentiating their products, through design, advertising, etc. A new measure that captures this concept is "product-market fluidity," developed in Hoberg et al. (2014) . It uses textual analysis of product descriptions found in SEC 10-K forms to estimate the intensity of a firm's product-market threats. A higher product-market fluidity measure means a firm's competitive environment changes frequently, so it faces stronger competitive pressure.
We use product market fluidity to measure the competitive pressure faced by firms in our sample. 14 The sample used in Hoberg et al. (2014) begins in the year 1997, so it does not cover all years in our sample. However, fluidity seems to vary little over time, so we compute each firm's average fluidity and use those averages for our entire sample period. We split our sample of cartel firms into observations with above-median fluidity (stronger competitive pressure) and belowmedian fluidity (weaker competitive pressure) and then match each subsample to non-cartel firms.
The matching procedure is the same as for the overall sample, but adding firm-level product market fluidity as an additional matching variable to ensure homogeneity between cartel and non-cartel firms in this dimension.
We present the results from the fluidity sample splits in Table 4 . We find a strong negative association between leverage and collusion periods for firms facing stronger competitive pressure (high fluidity), and an insignificant association for firms facing weaker competitive pressure (low fluidity). The results thus support Hypothesis H5. 
The Economic Benefit from Collusion
Hypothesis H6 predicts that cartel firms should be willing to accept larger reductions in leverage to safeguard the stability of their cartel if the cartel is more important to them. Reducing leverage is costly, because the firms lose the tax shields and other benefits that higher debt would generate, but firms should be willing to take drastic measures if joining a cartel entails significant 13 Using the number of competitors in a market has the same shortcomings. 14 We thank Jerry Hoberg and Gordon Phillips for making their fluidity data available.
benefits.
Measuring how much a cartel benefited its members is difficult, since the counterfactual noncollusion performance cannot be observed. So-called "overcharges" (cartel prices less non-cartel prices) are used in practice to discuss how much the cartel firms benefited from collusion, but overcharges are just as difficult to measure empirically, and data on overcharges are often not available (partly because many cases are settled before discovery has been completed). We therefore use an indirect measure of the importance of a cartel to its members: The fines the cartel firms had to pay after being discovered and investigated. This is a measure of how important a cartel was to a cartel firm because (intuitively) fines tend to be higher if cartels caused greater market distortions and allowed cartel firms to earn larger profits. 15 The PIC data includes data on fines imposed on cartel firms. We divide each firm's fine (including fines imposed on executives) by its sales revenue at the start of collusion, and we split the sample of firms into subsamples with above-median and below-median fine-to-revenue ratios. Then we perform tests similar to those reported in Tables 3   and 4 , for the two subsamples. We only include cartel firms in this analysis, as fines are pertinent to cartel firms only.
The results are reported in Table 5 , Columns (1) and (2). Firms with large fines had large reductions in leverage (over 6 percentage points), while firms with low fines did not reduce their leverage. This suggests that if a cartel was likely important to its member firms, then those firms were willing to implement large reductions in leverage to make it stable.
One may be concerned with the reliability of the fines data as a measure of the importance of a cartel. First, in some cases where the PIC data reports zero fines, it may be more appropriate to treat them as missing values. Replicating the sample-split analysis after excluding zero-fine cartel firms, we find that the results strengthen, as shown in Columns (3) and (4). Second, fines may be higher for longer-lived cartels, so the reported fines may proxy for the longevity of a cartel, not its importance. This does not seem to be an important concern for our results, either. In our data, fines have a positive but weak correlation with cartel longevity (the correlation is 0.11), and our results hold if we normalize the fines data, dividing the fines-to-revenues ratio by the number of years a cartel was active. Third, fines are lower if a cartel firm benefited from "leniency laws", i.e., if it informed the antitrust authorities of the illegal activities (see, e.g., Miller 2009; Dong et al. 2016; and Dasgupta and Žaldokas 2018) . If such a firm participated in an economically important cartel, we would then misclassify it because of a low or zero fine. However, only three cartel firms in our sample benefited from leniency laws, and dropping them does not change the results. grouping of firm-years into recession years or non-recession years would be problematic in our setting, given that we identify the effects of collusion by exploiting within-firm (time-series) variation. If we partitioned the sample, each subsample would contain only partial data for each firm spread out through several interleaved periods. For instance, if we estimated the effects of collusion using the recession subsample, we would be dropping non-recession observations for the same firm, causing missing-data problems. For this reason, we set up our analysis as a triple-differences test, interacting the Collusion dummy with a dummy indicator for recession years, to study whether cartel firms reduce their leverage by less during collusion years that are also recession years.
This analysis, based on time-varying incentives to collude, also allows us to introduce a placebo test, to examine whether our main results might be driven by unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity. Specifically, we test whether cartel firms are (for unexplained reasons) more sensitive to changes in the economic environment (including their competitive environment) than firms that never joined a cartel, and whether this might explain the decreases in leverage during collusion periods (or the leverage rebounds when collusion ends). We explore this possibility by adding a second interaction to our triple-differences specification, between the Post-Collusion dummy and the dummy for recession years. The interaction between Post-Collusion and Recession Year acts as a placebo: If we do not find differential effects during post-collusion years across recession and non-recession years, then it is unlikely that our earlier results are simply due to cartel firms being more sensitive to changes in their economic environment.
We classify recession years following NBER data. 16 The results are presented in Table 6 . As before, we find that there is a significant decrease in leverage during collusion years. Importantly, macroeconomic conditions seem to have a significant impact on changes in leverage: The interaction term of Recession Year and Collusion is positive. Both coefficients have significant economic magnitudes, so the evidence supports Hypothesis H7.
Table 6 here
Regarding the placebo test, we find a small and insignificant coefficient for the interaction between Recession year and Post Collusion. This suggests that cartel firms do not change their leverage differently when colluding during recession years simply because they are more sensitive to shocks (or because they are somehow different to non-cartel firms in unobserved dimensions). This result reinforces those for Hypotheses H4-H7, in the sense that it more strongly connects the findings to the strategic role of debt and that it helps rule out alternative explanations, as discussed in the next section.
Additional Results and Alternative Explanations
We now present additional results, going beyond the hypotheses developed in Section 2 and tested in Section 4. First, we present results that help better understand the context in which collusion takes place. Then we address possible alternative explanations for our results, i.e., explanations not linked to the strategic use of leverage to stabilize cartels.
Additional Results: Profitability and Payout
The literature on cartels and collusion shows that adverse economic shocks are frequently the motivation for the start of collusion (see, e.g., Lamoreaux (1985) , Schmitt and Weder (1998 ), Connor (2011 ), or Herold and Paha (2018 collusion periods is likely much lower than it was during the pre-shock, pre-collusion period. In fact, even under collusion, cartel firm profits may be lower than they were during the pre-collusion period.
To explore this, we now analyze the profitability of the cartel firms in our sample, using the same approach we have taken above, to analyze their financial leverage. First, we estimate Equation (2) with Profitability as the dependent variable, and we plot the coefficients for Collusion and their 95% confidence intervals (similar to the approach used to create Figure 1) . Figure 3 shows the results. The evidence on pre-collusion profitability is consistent with the literature: There is a significant reduction in profitability shortly before collusion starts. Profitability reverts to average levels once collusion starts, and while the coefficients are positive for some of the collusion years, this increase is not statistically significant.
Figure 3 here
We obtain the same result, that profitability increases but the increase is not significant, when estimating Equation (1) with Profitability as the dependent variable. The results are presented in Table 7 , Column (1). Profitability is increased by 0.3% during collusion periods, but the increase is not statistically significant.
Table 7 here
Next, we examine the payout policy of cartel firms. Since collusion is illegal, shareholders benefit if any incremental profits are paid out immediately, instead of being retained inside the firm and then potentially being lost to cover fines, penalties from civil lawsuits, etc., if and when the cartel is discovered and terminated by the authorities. We examine changes in payout by estimating Equation (1) with Total Payout as the dependent variable. The results are presented in Table 7 , Column (2). The coefficient for Collusion is 0.8%, which is large, compared with the average payout ratio of 2.2% (see Table 1 ).
We can further examine how exactly cash is returned to shareholders, by estimating Equation
(1) with the dividends-to-assets ratio or the repurchases-to-assets ratio as the dependent variable. We present the results in Table 7 , Columns (3) and (4). We find no significant change in the dividend payout during collusion periods, and the coefficient for Collusion in Column (4) suggests that the payout increase reported in Column (2) consists of increased share repurchases. This is not surprising, for two reasons. First, as shown in Table 1 , the dividends-to-assets ratio of cartel firms is zero, while the repurchases-to-assets ratio is large at 2.2%. If share repurchases were the method used to pay out cash to shareholders in pre-collusion periods (possibly for tax reasons, if the income taxes due for shareholders are lower with share repurchases than with dividends), then one should expect that cartel firms continue using share repurchases. Furthermore, if cartel firms earn incremental profits from collusion, they may regard them as temporary, because a cartel can break up or be detected by the authorities at any moment. The traditional view of payout policy is that dividend cuts are costly, and that firms increase dividends only if they are confident that they can keep up the payout in the future; if not, share repurchases are a better way to return cash to shareholders. If cartel profit increases are viewed as temporary, then cartel firms should use share repurchases to pay out those profits, not dividends.
Alternative Explanations
Profitability Changes and Leverage Changes
As described in the literature, cartels are often formed after negative shocks hit an industry.
That is consistent with the pre-collusion Profitability pattern shown in Figure 3 , which shows a drop in profitability followed by a partial rebound during collusion. But such shocks could also affect the leverage decisions of the firms in that industry. For example, leverage could increase with profitability in a trade-off theory setup, because of the benefits of tax shields; or it could decrease with profitability in a pecking-order setting, because when more internal funds are available, the firm can rely less on external funds, including debt. If an exogenous shock affects both the cartel formation decision and the leverage choices, then one could argue that our results can be explained by a missing variable (profitability), because it affects both decisions.
Profitability changes, however, are unlikely to explain our findings, for several reasons. First, Profitability does not change significantly during collusion periods (see Table 7 , Column (1)), while
Leverage does. Second, our results are obtained while controlling for lagged Profitability (compare Cols. 1 and 3 with Cols. 2 and 4 in Table 2 ). Third, it would be difficult to reconcile the results from the triple-differences analyses using arguments based on the trade-off theory or the pecking-order theory.
Cost of Debt Financing
An alternative indirect link between the decision to form a cartel and the decision to reduce leverage could be constructed based on changes to the cost of borrowing. If being a cartel firm worsens the terms under which firms can raise debt financing, then they should naturally make less use of debt in their capital structure.
A priori, this is unconvincing, because of the secrecy surrounding cartels. It would be difficult for a lender to actually observe that a firm has entered into a collusion agreement.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that lenders would view cartel firms as below-average credit risks, since profitability may increase and (due to the cartel agreement) likely becomes more predictable.
Nevertheless, we can explore whether there are adverse effects on credit terms for firms that become cartel firms. We use data on private loan contracting terms from the Loan Pricing
Corporation's (LPC) Dealscan database. The Dealscan database contains detailed loan information for U.S. and foreign commercial loans made to government entities and corporations. 17 Merging the Dealscan data with our main database causes significant sample attrition, since loan data is only available in years in which our sample firms signed new loan contracts. We are left with 518 cartelfirm observations for 84 cartel firms, which are then matched to control firms observations with available loan data using the approach described in Section 3.
To measure whether a cartel firm's credit environment has tightened, we focus on whether the coupon has increased, and whether a loan is more likely secured. We define Spread as the "all-indrawn" spread (in basis points) over LIBOR, computed as the sum of coupon and annual fees on the loan in excess of six-month LIBOR. If a firm took out several loans during a given year, we use the average spread. Next, we define Secured as a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a firm took out a secured loan during a given year, and 0 otherwise. We estimate equation (1) using either Spread or Secured as dependent variables. We use the same set of control variables as in the earlier leverage regressions, but we also report results for regressions that additionally include Leverage as an explanatory variable, since changes in the loan terms could be explained by the endogenous change in leverage we documented earlier.
17 Chava and Roberts (2008) contains a detailed description of this database.
The results are presented in Table 8 . Column (1) shows that the loan spreads are actually narrower during collusion periods, not wider. Column (2) shows the same result when leverage is included as an independent variable. Columns (3) and (4) show that there is no significant change in the frequency of loans being secured during collusion periods. Overall, it does not seem that the credit environment is tighter for cartel firms. Table 8 here
Long-run risk
Another possible alternative explanation for our results is based on the risk of a cartel being discovered or destabilizing and failing. If firms regard this as an important risk factor, a plausible response would be to reduce other risk exposures, including their financial leverage. This is not a convincing explanation, for several reasons. First, cartel firms do not seem to be preparing for bad outcomes, since they increase their payout during collusion periods. Second, during recessions firms are likely more concerned with their overall risk exposure, so we would expect them to try harder to mitigate important risks. However, we find that the leverage reduction is less pronounced during recessions. Third, the leverage reduction happens soon after a cartel is formed, not in later years, when the risk of failure or detection should be more acute.
Attempts to Hide Profits
A fourth alternative explanation for our results can be constructed around the idea that cartel firms have to hide their activities, including the illicit profits they generate. Paying off outstanding debt is a possible method to "launder" such profits, and it leads to reductions in leverage.
Paying down debt is not the only way to use cash, and since it is costly (in terms of lost tax shields), we would expect cartel firms to find other methods to use up cash. For example, we would expect them to undertake cash acquisitions, including acquisitions that add no value or are moderately value-destroying. We examine this possibility by studying the M&A activity of cartel firms during collusion periods. If there are more cash deals, and they add less value or destroy more, then this would support the alternative explanation that "laundering" cash is the motive for reductions in leverage.
We combine our data with data on mergers and acquisitions from SDC Platinum to identify merger deals, and with stock price information from CRSP to compute cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) upon announcement for completed deals. The average number of completed cash deals per firm-year is 0.51. We present the regression results in Table 9 . Column (1) presents the results for the number of cash acquisitions: We estimate equation (1) using log(1+number of cash acquisitions)
in a given year as the dependent variable. Columns (2) and (3) no acquisition activity, leading to a smaller sample size than in Column (1).
Table 9 here
The results in Column (1) of Table 9 show that there is no significant increase in the frequency of cash acquisitions during collusion years. Importantly, in Columns (2) and (3) we find no evidence that the cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement dates are different during collusion periods. Notice that the lack of statistical significance in the CARs is not due to the sample size; the Collusion coefficients are positive, but they are economically very small, between 0% and 0.4%. Overall, we find no support for the "laundering" explanation. 
Conclusions
The goal of this paper is to test whether cartel firms reduce their leverage during collusion periods, in an attempt to make their cartel more stable. The intuition is modeled in Maksimovic (1988) , and we expand the set of predictions for two reasons: First, to better understand what the implications are and how the mechanism operates; and second, to allow for sharper tests that raise the bar for both this explanation and for possible alternative explanations. We find that cartel firms (on average) reduce their leverage when collusion starts, or soon thereafter, and that leverage rebounds to normal, non-collusion levels near the time when collusion ends. The changes in leverage are more pronounced in settings for which intuition suggests that they should be more pronounced, for instance settings in which cartels are inherently less stable. Overall the evidence is consistent with the intuition from Maksimovic (1988) , and it conflicts with a list of possible alternative explanations.
Our results are important for the capital structure literature. Some of this work analyzes the interdependence of financial decisions and product-market decisions, but this analysis has focused on traditional product market strategies like product pricing, output choices, quality differentiation, advertising, etc. Our findings suggest that new insights can be gained by expanding this set of product-market strategies: Studying anti-competitive behavior could help explain patterns that otherwise have no convincing explanation.
Our findings also make an important contribution to the antitrust literature, by confirming empirically that leverage can be used strategically, to add stability to cartel agreements. Little is known about cartels and their operations, since they are illegal and secrecy seriously limits the access to reliable data. Our findings are consistent with the idea that the strategic use of leverage is one mechanism that cartels use to prevent cartel breakups. This is only one mechanism that cartels can use, of course, but our findings suggest that it should be taken more seriously, hopefully motivating
further research into what strategies cartel firms use to make their cartels more stable.
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Figure 1
This figure plots the coefficients βh and their 95% confidence intervals for the regression = + ∑ β ℎ * ℎ + + µ + , using book leverage as the dependent variable. The subscript h indexes the years that immediately precede collusion years (h {−2, −1}), years that immediately follow collusion years (h {1, 2}), or years that are collusion years (h {col1,col2,col3,oth.col} for full collusion years, h = 0 -for a partial collusion year at the start of a cartel, and h = 0 + for a partial collusion year at the end of a cartel). The indicator variable dih takes a value of 1 if a firm operates in one of those years, and 0 otherwise. The results suggest that cartel firms reduce their leverage during collusion years, that the changes are strongest in the first two full years of collusion, that there is no apparent reduction in leverage immediately before the onset of collusion, and that leverage rebounds to average levels when collusion ends. 
Figure 2
This figure plots the coefficients βh for the regression = + ∑ β ℎ * ℎ + + µ + , using log(Debt) or log(Assets) as the dependent variables. The subscript h indexes the years that immediately precede collusion years (h {−2, −1}), years that immediately follow collusion years (h {1, 2}), or years that are collusion years (h {col1, col2, col3, oth.col} for full collusion years, h = 0 -for a partial collusion year at the start of a cartel, and h = 0 + for a partial collusion year at the end of a cartel). The indicator variable dih takes a value of 1 if a firm operates in one of those years, and 0 otherwise. The results suggest that changes in leverage are driven by changes in the debt levels of cartel firms, since the changes to their assets are minor in comparison to changes in debt.
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Figure 3
This figure plots the coefficients βh and their 95% confidence intervals for the regression = + ∑ β ℎ * ℎ + + µ + , using Profitability as the dependent variable. The subscript h indexes the years that immediately precede collusion years (h {−2, −1}), years that immediately follow collusion years (h {1, 2}), or years that are collusion years (h {col1, col2, col3, oth.col} for full collusion years, h = 0 -for a partial collusion year at the start of a cartel, and h = 0 + for a partial collusion year at the end of a cartel). The indicator variable dih takes a value of 1 if a firm operates in one of those years, and 0 otherwise. The results suggest that the onset of collusion is preceded by a negative shock to profitability, and that cartels are formed in response to such negative shocks. There is weak evidence of increased profits during collusion periods, which is consistent with the interpretation that cartels are formed in response to negative profitability shocks. Table 6 . Recessions
This table presents results of analyzing the association between collusion and leverage, using a triple-differences approach. The dependent variable is Leverage. Recession Year is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 in a recession year, as defined using the NBER recession year list, and 0 otherwise. Collusion takes a value of 1 for cartel firms during collusion years, and 0 otherwise; Post Collusion takes a value of 1 for cartel firms during the 5 years after a cartel is dissolved, and 0 otherwise. The Control Variables include lagged Profitability, Tangibility, Cash Flow Volatility and Sales (see the Appendix for definitions). We do not report the coefficient for Recession, since that dummy variable is collinear with the year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the industry level. Significant at: *10%, **5% and ***1%.
(1 (2), the dependent variable is Spread. This is the "All-in-Drawn" spread (in basis-points) over LIBOR, computed as the sum of coupon and annual fees on the loan in excess of six-month LIBOR (averaged, if a firm took out several loans in a year). In Columns (3)-(4), the dependent variable Secured is a firm-year dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm obtained a secured loan (or multiple secured loans) in a year, and zero otherwise. Collusion takes a value of 1 for cartel firms during collusion years, and 0 otherwise; Post Collusion takes a value of 1 for cartel firms during the 5 years after a cartel is dissolved, and 0 otherwise. The Control Variables include lagged Profitability, Tangibility, Cash Flow Volatility and Sales (see the Appendix for definitions). Columns (2) and (4) additionally control for Leverage. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the industry level. Significant at: *10%, **5% and ***1%.
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